Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite communications are shifting from a contingency option to operational infrastructure, prompting renewed scrutiny over how organisations protect data sent over services such as Starlink.
In an editorial commentary, Senetas chief technology officer and co-founder Julian Fay said rising use of LEO connectivity across defence, emergency response, maritime, energy, mining and remote operations means security teams should treat satellite links with the same level of rigour as fibre, private WANs, cloud interconnects and carrier services.
Fay argued that while LEO providers may offer built-in security, organisations with regulated, sovereign or mission-critical requirements often need additional assurance over key ownership, auditability and cryptographic control. “The key question is not simply whether a LEO service is ‘encrypted’. The more important question is who controls it and whether the cryptography is ready for the quantum era?” he wrote.
Unlike fixed terrestrial routes, data over LEO links can traverse satellites, gateways and ground stations operated by the provider, potentially crossing multiple jurisdictions. Fay said this does not automatically make a service insecure, but it can place parts of the communications path outside a customer’s direct control, raising questions about where trust boundaries sit, who controls encryption keys, and where sensitive plaintext may exist in the network.
He also pointed to complexity in how LEO services are delivered, with satellite operators, carriers and systems integrators potentially all involved, while responsibility for compliance and data protection remains with the customer.
Fay said organisations should not assume that traditional VPN architectures will always be the best fit for LEO, noting that service characteristics such as carrier-grade NAT (CG-NAT) and routing behaviour can influence where and how encryption should be applied. He also challenged the assumption that stronger encryption necessarily degrades performance, arguing modern approaches can minimise impact.
Quantum computing was raised as an additional driver for customer-controlled encryption. Fay said organisations should consider whether their move to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is dependent on a provider’s roadmap, and whether they need agility to migrate on their own timelines.
To support security planning for LEO adoption, Fay recommended organisations ask five questions: what data will traverse the link and how sensitive it is; where provider encryption starts and stops; who controls key generation, rotation and destruction; whether compliance with standards and sovereign requirements can be demonstrated; and whether the chosen approach can support quantum-resistant cryptography.
He said these issues have particular relevance in Australia and the wider Asia-Pacific region, where geography can make LEO connectivity attractive for remote operations and critical services, but where use cases may involve sensitive operational data, public safety considerations or national security implications.
