Assured access to precision navigation and timing (PNT) is no longer a technical enabler but a strategic dependency for modern defence forces, according to Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, as the Australian Defence Force confronts a rapidly deteriorating global security environment.
Delivering the keynote address at the Precision Navigation and Timing Conference (#PNT2026) in Sydney, LTGEN Coyle warned that future military advantage will depend on the ability to protect, recover and operate through disruption to PNT in an era defined by information warfare, artificial intelligence, uncrewed systems and data-centric operations.
“PNT isn’t a subsystem,” Coyle said. “It is the invisible connective tissue that allows our joint, integrated, all-domain force to function. Without assured PNT, tempo slows, precision degrades and synchronisation fails.”
Coyle described a strategic landscape in which the character of conflict is evolving faster than at any point in recent history. While the human cost and moral gravity of war remain unchanged, she said emerging technologies are fundamentally reshaping how wars are fought, and exposing new vulnerabilities across military and civilian systems alike.
Modern societies, including Australia’s, are increasingly reliant on interconnected digital and space-based systems, she noted. Severe degradation or loss of PNT would not only undermine military operations, but ripple across aviation, maritime trade, critical infrastructure and the broader economy.
Lessons from contemporary conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East underscore the stakes. Persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, the mass deployment of uncrewed systems, and the fusion of kinetic and information warfare have made it harder to conceal forces and easier to disrupt command, control and logistics. In that environment, Coyle said, the loss of PNT rapidly erodes combat power.
At the heart of the challenge is what defence planners describe as “navigation warfare” – the contest to assure one’s own navigation and timing while denying or degrading an adversary’s. According to Coyle, Australia is already operating in a ‘NavWar’ environment.
The most prevalent threats remain jamming and spoofing of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), which she described as “precise, globally accessible, but vulnerable by design”. Even low-power jammers can have significant local effects, while spoofing attacks – in which false signals deceive receivers into calculating incorrect position or time – are becoming increasingly sophisticated.
“These threats are not theoretical,” she said. “We’ve seen them used repeatedly in real-world conflicts.”
Beyond electronic attack, Coyle highlighted cyber vulnerabilities in satellites, ground infrastructure and user equipment, as well as the growing risk posed by anti-satellite weapons. Advances in these capabilities, she said, threaten PNT constellations across all orbital regimes and could have cascading effects across military operations.
Despite GNSS being “free, precise and plentiful”, Coyle cautioned against assuming it is sufficient for every mission. Different tasks require different levels of accuracy and resilience. What matters, she said, is having PNT that is “appropriate to task” and robust enough to survive contested environments.
“PNT is not just a technical enabler,” she said. “It is a strategic dependency. It underwrites the credibility of our deterrence and the trust commanders place in their force.”
In response, the ADF is shifting its approach from systems to mindset. PNT assurance, Coyle argued, must be treated as mission assurance and embedded across doctrine, training and capability development.
Defence has established a Joint Navigation and Spectrum Warfare Directorate to serve as the hub for PNT, navigation warfare and electronic warfare. The directorate acts as the ADF’s PNT authority, monitoring threats, shaping policy, conducting field testing, and evolving tactics, techniques and procedures.
The ADF is also accelerating work on next-generation capabilities, including quantum sensors, optical clocks, alternative navigation methods and undersea navigation. A key milestone is the delivery of Defence’s first dedicated time system, intended to provide assured timing and frequency across the department.
Crucially, Coyle stressed that PNT resilience is not solely a defence problem.
“This is a national endeavour,” she said. Universities provide the fundamental science in quantum technologies and advanced algorithms, while industry translates innovation into deployable, scalable capability and helps Australia build sovereign resilience.
Commercial technology, she added, can be harnessed to strengthen military capability, allowing Defence to move faster than traditional acquisition cycles through experimentation and prototyping.
Coyle said senior Defence leadership is increasingly aware of the risks posed by PNT disruption, with the issue now briefed regularly at the highest levels. Broader government understanding is improving, she said, but continued education and engagement across sectors is essential.
Asked about the role of government in developing alternative PNT infrastructure, Coyle pointed to the need for layered approaches rather than single solutions.
“You can’t just rely on one source,” she said. “Primary, alternate, contingency and emergency – you need multiple paths.”
She acknowledged the challenge of funding competing national priorities, but argued that resilience in energy, fuel and PNT must be treated as interconnected elements of national security.
Coyle concluded with a stark message for the defence and space community.
“In a contested environment, the side that can effectively manage its PNT is the side that stays in the fight,” she said. “PNT resilience is national security – and it’s not optional.”
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