NASA’s independent Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has released its 2025 annual report, warning that the agency’s most significant risks stem not from a single program but from interconnected pressures across workforce capability, acquisition strategy, technical authority, budget constraints and the growing complexity of human spaceflight.
The panel, established by Congress in 1968 following the Apollo 1 fire, advises both NASA and lawmakers on safety matters. While the 2025 report acknowledges progress across several major programs, it cautions that as missions become more ambitious — particularly under the Artemis lunar campaign — risk management must evolve in step.
“Independent assessments like this will make NASA better,” said NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman. “The panel’s report underscores areas where we must raise the bar, from how we structure oversight and manage integrated risk to how we declare and learn from anomalies.”
This year’s review focused on five core areas: NASA’s strategic vision and governance; the Moon to Mars program; the future U.S. presence in low Earth orbit (LEO); health and medical risks in human spaceflight; and development of the X-59 Low-Boom Flight Demonstrator.
The panel noted progress in Artemis II readiness and credited the Moon to Mars Program Office with strengthening oversight integration. It also highlighted continued safe operations aboard the International Space Station, advances in astronaut health research and the first flight of the X-59 demonstrator — a key step in efforts to enable quieter supersonic flight over land.
However, the report flagged significant concerns. Artemis III, which aims to return astronauts to the lunar surface, was described as carrying a high-risk posture given its technical complexity and schedule pressures. The panel also pointed to lessons emerging from Boeing’s Starliner Crew Flight Test, long-term planning for space station deorbit, and broader systemic challenges across the agency.
To address these pressures, ASAP recommended three priority actions: realigning governance of acquisition strategies for human spaceflight capabilities across the agency; re-examining mission objectives and system architecture for Artemis III and subsequent missions to balance risk more effectively; and requiring the timely declaration of mishaps or high-visibility close calls to improve transparency and corrective action.
Isaacman said NASA was already moving to implement changes in line with the report’s findings, including recalibrating its acquisition strategy to better weigh build-versus-buy-versus-service procurement decisions. He also highlighted workforce initiatives aimed at restoring core technical competencies, including converting some contractor roles to civil servant positions and increasing launch cadence to reinforce operational proficiency.
The agency recently released findings from its Starliner Program Investigation Team, formally classifying the mission as a Type A mishap — NASA’s highest level of incident classification — and outlining corrective measures. According to Isaacman, this transparency reflects a broader commitment to accountability as NASA transitions toward commercial partnerships in low Earth orbit and works to accelerate human landing system proposals for a planned return to the Moon by 2028.
Retired U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Susan J. Helms, chair of ASAP, said the panel commends NASA for efforts in 2025 to strengthen risk management despite organisational turbulence.
As NASA moves deeper into its Moon to Mars ambitions and prepares for a future commercial LEO ecosystem, the report underscores a recurring lesson from six decades of human spaceflight: technical achievement alone is not sufficient. Sustained safety performance depends on governance discipline, clear lines of authority, workforce expertise and the willingness to identify and confront risk before it manifests operationally.
